



State-level Credibility & Durability 2026

U.S. Election

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Executive Summary

The United States' federal system gives individual states significant authority over energy, climate and infrastructure policy. As a result, state governments often play a decisive role in shaping decarbonization pathways, and that role has grown as federal policy has shifted.

Since the new administration took office in January 2025, four major federal actions have reached across many states at once: emergency orders delaying coal plant retirements, cuts to clean energy tax credits, and the repeal of federal greenhouse gas standards for vehicles and power plants. States have few levers to respond beyond the courts. A Democratic House or Senate after the midterms could slow further federal moves through oversight and spending, but reversing them would require the President. With federal direction largely set, the differences in decarbonization pathways will come mainly from the states, which is the focus of this assessment.

This midterm Credibility & Durability assessment evaluates both the strength of current state-level climate/decarbonization policies (**credibility**) and the likelihood that those policies strengthen or weaken over time (**durability**), providing a forward-looking view of climate policy risk and opportunity across the US. The 2026 assessment points to a climate policy landscape that is becoming increasingly divided, but frozen in place. While the period from 2022 to 2024 was characterized by convergence as many states strengthened decarbonization policies, that trend has now reversed. Democratic-led states have continued to build policy credibility, while Republican-led states have seen broader policy rollback, resulting in a widening credibility gap between states.

The divergence is being driven primarily by emissions and power-generation policy. These policy levers have proven more politically elastic, with targets and regulatory frameworks

capable of moving rapidly in response to changing political priorities. By contrast, transport and buildings policies have remained comparatively stable, reflecting their more incremental and embedded nature. Despite weaker policy support in some jurisdictions, renewable deployment has continued, highlighting that market fundamentals, project pipelines and technology costs remain important drivers alongside public policy.

Looking ahead, the durability outlook is less one of divergence and more one of inertia. Climate policy has become less politically salient as affordability, energy security and broader economic concerns have moved higher up state agendas. As a result, many states now score as neutral on durability, indicating neither strong momentum for additional climate action nor significant risk of further rollback. Electoral considerations nevertheless appear relevant to specific issues: data-center support is weaker among governors seeking re-election in both parties, with a larger contrast between incumbent and outgoing Democrats. Republicans remain more supportive across electoral groups, although the partisan gap narrows among outgoing governors. These differences sit within a broader pattern of entrenchment, with legislative strength reinforcing existing policy direction and limited momentum for states to depart from established positions.

Overall, the picture is not one of accelerating decarbonization or widespread retrenchment. Instead, the US is increasingly characterized by distinct state-level policy pathways: high-credibility states generally remain committed to advancing their decarbonization frameworks, while lower-credibility states continue to maintain more limited levels of policy support. The 2026 elections may influence the direction of travel in a handful of jurisdictions, and at federal level may slow further rollback rather than reverse it, but the broader story is one of widening policy divergence combined with slowing political momentum.

Midterms could slow federal action but not reverse existing policy

Four examples of major federal actions since the new administration took office in January 2025 show how federal policy can reach across many states at once, leaving states to respond mainly through the courts.

A Democratic House or Senate could slow further moves through oversight and spending, but reversing them would need the President.

With federal direction largely set, the differences in energy and decarbonization policy will come mainly from the states, which is where the rest of this pack focuses.

	Federal change since 2024 election	What it means for states	If Democrats win the House or Senate
Fossil plant retirement delays	Since May 2025 4.4 GW of coal retirements held back by rolling 90-day DOE orders	Overrides state plans in MI, PA, IN, CO, WA and FL; ratepayers pick up the costs	<div>Can influence</div> <div>Hearings on costs; courts remain the main check</div>
Clean energy tax credits	July 2025 2028 wind and solar credits cut off, subject to transition rules	Post-2027 pipelines harder to finance, in red and blue states alike	<div>Can influence</div> <div>Can block further cuts; restoring them needs the President</div>
Vehicle emission standards	February 2026 24 states suing over repeal of federal vehicle GHG rules	Courts or own GHG policies, though California-style vehicle rules face federal challenge	<div>Limited</div> <div>Can't restore standards without the President</div>
Power plant carbon rules	September 2026 16 Nov repeal of most 2024 carbon standards takes effect	No federal floor; states with their own targets carry the load	<div>Limited</div> <div>Can scrutinize, but can't block the repeal</div>


Sources: DOE Section 202(c) orders (POWER, Mar 2026); EPA final rules (Feb and Sep 2026); Inside Climate News; AP; OBBBA (Jul 2025)

State Races: 36 elections, 19 open seats, 11 contested, four potential flips

The 2026 midterms could reshape the balance of political control across US states, with the governor elections particularly closely contested. While most races are expected to remain with the incumbent party, a small number of potential flips could shift the overall balance.

By 2027, it is predicted that there will be 20 Democratic and 20 Republican governors, plus 11 contested races. If the contested races go the way they lean, that becomes 25D, 24R and one toss-up (Georgia).

State level Governor Elections 2026



6 Key Takeaways for the 2026 Midterms

The 2026 US Midterms Credibility and Durability assessment points to a more fragmented state policy landscape.

Current policy credibility is increasingly divided along political lines, while the forward outlook is becoming more neutral as climate policy loses momentum.

Together, six takeaways highlight where policy support is strengthening, where it is being rolled back, and where the midterms could alter the direction of travel.

Credibility

01

State policy pathways are diverging again

The convergence seen between 2022 and 2024 has reversed. While Republican-led states were responsible for much of the earlier improvement, Democratic trifectas have continued to strengthen as Republican trifectas have moved into rollback. The result is a widening credibility gap between states and increasingly distinct policy pathways across the US.

Durability

01

Durability informs future credibility changes

States with stronger historical durability scores generally experienced more favorable credibility changes between 2024 and 2026, while lower durability states were more likely to see credibility decline. Historical durability, therefore, acts less as a guarantee of future outcomes and more as an indicator of state's ability to sustain its prevailing policy direction, helping to reinforce existing credibility trajectories.

02

Emissions and Power policies are driving the divide

There are significant differences across the change in the four decarbonization policy levers. Most of the deterioration in Republican trifectas is concentrated in emissions and power generation. These levers appear more politically elastic, while transport and buildings policies tend to be comparatively sticky and change more gradually.

02

Reduced salience has resulted in climate policy falling down the political agenda, however electoral pressures shape support for data centers

The state-level durability outlook has shifted from polarized to neutral as affordability, energy security and broader economic priorities displace climate policy, limiting momentum for either major advances or further rollback. While some states have shown support, this doesn't replace the federal funding withdrawn, and states can't replace federal leasing and permitting authority. Data-center support nevertheless shows signs of electoral sensitivity: governors seeking re-election are less supportive in both parties, with a more pronounced contrast among Democrats.

03

Power policy rollbacks coincided with canceled capacity, but deployment continues even without policy support

Renewables deployment proved resilient to policy rollback, helped by developers safe-harboring projects ahead of the federal tax-credit deadline. States with weaker policy support saw a larger increase in canceled capacity, suggesting state policy may influence investment outcomes, although interconnection reforms may also be a contributing factor.

03

State energy policy is increasingly frozen in place

Most states now appear settled into established policy positions. High-credibility states generally retain supportive policy frameworks, while lower-credibility states remain concentrated around weaker policy positions. The dominant durability story is therefore one of policy persistence and limited momentum, rather than widespread progress or rollback.

C&D Scoring



A. Credibility

For each state, a credibility score will be assigned to reflect the extent to which the state’s current policies support climate-related objectives and targets.

Individual scores are assigned to reflect state’s policies related to:

- Emissions commitments
- Power Generation
- Transportation
- Buildings

Credibility Scoring Matrix

	① Credibility	Current Net Zero Policy Maturity				
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Emissions Commitment	No Emissions Target					Net Zero Legal Legislated By 2050 Or 60% By 2030
Power Generation	No Renewable Portfolio Standard					Renewable Energy Generation Target 100% By 2030
Transport	Limited EV Supportive Policies					Legally Enforced ICE Ban (Light Vehicles) 2050 +/- Adoption of ACC II
Buildings	Low Building Policy Ranking					High Buildings Policy Ranking
	2009 DOE Equivalent IECC					2024 DOE Equivalent IECC + retrofit programs +/- gas bans
	Weighted Average = Credibility Score					


1.1 From Convergence To Divergence

Between 2022 and 2024, the overall direction was one of convergence. Credibility improved across the US on average, with Republican trifectas recording particularly strong gains and narrowing some of the gap with Democratic-led states.

However, this trend reversed between 2024 and 2026. Whilst the Democratic trifectas continued to strengthen, Republican trifectas moved sharply backwards, pulling the national average into decline and widening the difference between the two blocs.

Changes in political control contributed to this divergence but were not the only driver. National political sentiment, notably the “vibe shift” of the election of Trump 2.0 and the cost-of-living crisis appeared to contribute to the post 2024 change.

Credibility movements across all states 2022-2026



Note: Ribbons take the color of the bloc in force that period (control status = governor + legislature at the start of each period). Dashed outline = control changed at that election. Hawaii and DC 2024 carried from 2022.

1.2 The 2024 “Vibe Shift” Was Widespread and Substantial

The shift from convergence to divergence becomes clearer when states are grouped by political control.


Between 2022 and 2024, credibility improved across every political-control group. The gains were broad-based, with the largest increase recorded in Republican-led divided governments, closely followed by Republican trifectas. Because Republican-controlled states generally began from lower credibility levels, these improvements contributed to a degree of convergence with Democratic-led states, although Democratic trifectas remained substantially more credible in absolute terms.

Between 2024 and 2026, the change in direction was both widespread and substantial. Average credibility declined across every group except Democratic trifectas, which recorded only a modest improvement. The reversal therefore extended beyond Republican trifectas, encompassing Republican- and Democratic-led divided governments. This points to a broader weakening of state-level policy credibility, rather than an isolated shift within one political bloc.


Overall, the earlier broad-based improvement has given way to widespread deterioration. Democratic trifectas remain the clear exception, broadly maintaining their already high credibility scores while the other political-control groups have moved backwards. The widening gap therefore reflects less a renewed surge in Democratic ambition than their relative stability against a broad reversal elsewhere.

Average credibility change and absolute scores across 22-24 and 24-26

2022-2024



2024-2026




2.1 Credibility score components differ significantly across states


The overall credibility score masks significant differences across the four decarbonization policy levers. Transport policy is relatively well established across states, while emissions and power-generation credibility is more polarized. Buildings remain the weakest area, with many states still lacking strong policy support.

The midterms therefore matter not only for the overall direction of state policy, but also for whether existing strengths are sustained and weaker areas begin to catch up.


Emissions Decarbonization 14 states score >5





Transport 10 states score >5



Power Generation 2 states score >5



Buildings 0 states score >5



2.2 Emissions and power policies are driving the divide


The widening credibility gap between political parties was not driven evenly across policy areas. Most of the decline in Republican trifectas came from emissions and power-generation policy, where states rolled back targets, weakened requirements or reduced support for decarbonization measures. These two policy areas account for most of the deterioration in credibility and highlight how quickly policy direction can change when political priorities shift.

By contrast, Democratic trifectas strengthened their credibility, driven primarily by buildings policy. While some states continued to introduce new measures, the growing divergence was driven as much by policy rollbacks elsewhere as by new policy ambition. This suggests that states are increasingly following distinct decarbonization pathways, with some jurisdictions advancing clean-power and emissions-reduction agendas while others retrench policy support and allow market forces to dominate.

Therefore, power, emissions and transport appear the most politically elastic, as targets and state-level requirements can be strengthened or rolled back relatively quickly amidst cost pressures. Buildings are comparatively stickier, reflecting measures and standards that tend to change more gradually.

Overall, the widening credibility gap is being driven primarily by diverging approaches to emissions and power policy rather than by differences across the entire policy landscape.

Credibility point change in our decarbonization levers




3. Renewable power policy rollbacks coincided with canceled capacity, but deployment continues even without policy support

Power policy rollbacks (where the 2026 power generation credibility score decreased compared to the 2024 score due to rollback in renewables policies) has not translated into an immediate halt in renewable deployment. Between August 2024 and August 2026, states that experienced power-policy rollbacks still recorded stronger growth in planned wind and solar capacity than states without identified policy rollbacks. This reinforces that limited state support does not necessarily mean limited deployment, as projects continue to be driven by existing pipelines, federal tax-credit safe harboring, technology costs, resource quality and broader market dynamics.


However, rollback states also recorded a larger increase in canceled capacity; suggesting deployments could have been higher if state support had remained. Overall, the evidence suggests that while state policy can influence investment conditions, renewables deployment can continue even where overall policy support is reduced.

Change in planned and canceled wind and solar capacity: Power Generation score rollback vs no-rollback states

Planned wind & solar capacity change, Aug 2024 - Aug 2026



Canceled wind & capacity change, Aug 2024 – Aug 2026



Aggregate state % change

Source: US EIA

Note: Power Generation Credibility rollback states include Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia.

Note: Canceled projects may be inflated due to recent interconnection reforms and capacities reported in this preliminary inventory are best estimates of current generating capacity but are not meant to be capacity commitments by the associated facilities.

Targeted state action continues to strengthen policy credibility

Despite the wider divergence in state-level policy, Illinois, Delaware and Minnesota demonstrate that meaningful progress remains possible through targeted action across multiple decarbonization levers. All three states strengthened their overall credibility between 2024 and 2026, supported by combinations of emissions commitments, cleaner power targets, transport measures and building standards.

The composition of progress differs by state. Delaware has developed a broadly strong policy framework across all four levers, while Illinois’ improvement reflects advances across building policies. Minnesota has strengthened emissions, power and transport support, although weaker buildings policy remains a material gap. The examples highlight that credibility does not depend on a single flagship target. The strongest improvements occur when ambition is supported by a broader and increasingly coherent policy framework, while gaps in individual levers can still constrain the overall score.

States that are showing continued support

						Key
State	Emissions	Power Generation	Transport	Buildings	Score Change 2024 – 2026	▼ Deteriorated ▲ Improved ■ No change
Illinois 	Score: 6 Statutory target to achieve net zero by 2050 ■	Score: 5 100% clean energy by 2050 ■	Score: 3 Expansion and refinement of rebate program ■	▲ Score: 4 2024 IECC with amendments	4.3 > 4.5	
Delaware 	Score: 6 2023 Climate Change Solutions Act: net zero by 2050 ■	▲ Score: 4 RPS requires 40% of electricity to be sourced from renewables by 2035	▲ Score: 5 Adopted ACC II; 82% of fleet for sale by 2032 are EVs, though no 100% by 2035 EV target	▲ Score: 4 2024 IECC equivalent standards	4.3 > 4.8	
Minnesota 	▲ Score: 6 Statute 216H.02: net zero by 2050	▲ Score: 5 2023 target to achieve 100% carbon-free electricity by 2040	▲ Score: 4 22% of new vehicles sold are ZEVs by 2025; various financial incentives for infrastructure installation	■ Score: 1 2009 IECC equivalent standards	3.5 > 4.0	

Policy rollbacks are weakening support across multiple decarbonization levers

In contrast to the continued progress seen in leading states, Montana, Florida and North Dakota illustrate how policy credibility can deteriorate when support is weakened across several decarbonization levers. The nature of the rollback differs across the three states. Montana has reduced the role of emissions considerations and retains limited support across the wider policy framework. Florida’s decline reflects the removal of its long-term renewable-energy ambition alongside weak emissions commitments. North Dakota has also stepped back from earlier objectives, while retaining only limited support across transport and buildings.

However, renewable capacity can continue to grow through market fundamentals, existing projects and other incentives, even where explicit state support is deteriorating. These examples therefore point primarily to a less supportive and potentially less certain policy environment for future investment.

States that are showing deteriorating support

						Key
State	Emissions	Power Generation	Transport	Buildings	Score Change 2024 – 2026	▼ Deteriorated ▲ Improved ■ No change
Montana 	 Score: 1 HB 971 prohibited evaluation of GHG emissions for large projects; HB 285 & 270 rule MEP as “purely procedural”	 Score: 1 No mandated target as RPS repealed by HB 576 in 2021. In 2025 Governor vetoed the bipartisan Solar shares act.	 Score: 2 Offer various financial incentives for use of biofuel	 Score: 1 2009 IECC equivalent standards	2.5 > 1.3	
Florida 	 Score: 1 No GHG emissions targets enacted	 Score: 1 HB 1645 repealed 100% renewable energy by 2050 goal in 2024; 7.5% target non-binding	 Score: 2 Expected to receive \$198 million in NEVI funding for corridor charging infrastructure expansion	 Score: 3 2021 IECC equivalent standards	4.5 > 1.8	
North Dakota 	 Score: 1 Introduced that carbon neutrality is a voluntary goal by 2030	 Score: 1 Formally removed from state code via SB 2359 (2025) as 2015 objective surpassed through rapid development	 Score: 2 Grants for diesel emission reduction and MHD; NEVI planning but not much change	 Score: 1 2009 IECC equivalent standards	2.3 > 1.3	

C&D Scoring

B. Durability - the likelihood that current state-level climate/decarbonization policies strengthen or weaken over time

For each state, a durability score will be assigned to reflect the likelihood that the current climate-related policies will strengthen or weaken over time. Scores range from -2 for strong risk of climate rollback, to +2 for strong climate momentum

Individual scores are assigned to reflect:

- Regime Change
- Incumbent Intent
- Party pressure

Durability Scoring Matrix

	① Durability				
	Political Risk (Climate Pressure)				
	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
Regime Change	Rollback majority very likely	Rollback majority possible	Incumbent safe	Pro-climate gains possible	Pro-climate gains very likely
Incumbent Intent	Rollback planned and likely to pass		Incumbent faces blocking majority		Further action planned and likely to pass
Party Pressure		Base pushing rollback	Mixed or aligned with incumbent	Base pushing further action	

However, durability is not fully deterministic. Outliers like Alaska and Arizona demonstrate that state-specific circumstances, policy design and political developments can still lead to outcomes that differ from the broader pattern. Overall, historical durability provides a useful indication of future credibility changes, with political factors acting as accelerators of trends rather than the sole drivers of credibility outcomes.

% of all legislative seats (average of both chambers) held by governor party




2.1 Salience Fall: From polarized to neutral: half of states now show no clear policy momentum

The state-level policy outlook has become less polarized, but not necessarily more supportive of decarbonization. In earlier years, states were more widely distributed between positive momentum and rollback risk. By 2026, the picture has shifted decisively towards neutrality, with half of states now showing no clear expectation that policy will either strengthen or weaken. This reflects a broader decline in the political salience of climate policy, driven above all by affordability. Republican-led states have already made many of the most immediate rollbacks, limiting the scope for further deterioration. Rising power bills are also slowing progress in Democratic-led states: no state scores +2 in 2026, down from eight in 2024, and none has stepped in to replace federal support withdrawn from offshore wind.

The result is a more static outlook. Although the risk of further widespread rollback may be moderating, there is also less evidence of strong forward momentum. Neutrality therefore represents uncertainty rather than broad political consensus.

Number of states with these durability scores each year




2.2 Data Centers: a new fault line

Against a backdrop of slowing climate-policy momentum, data centers reveal a distinct pattern of political support. Republican governors are more supportive across every electoral group, but the partisan gap varies depending on whether governors face re-election or are leaving office. **Both parties appear sensitive to electoral incentives, with a more pronounced contrast among Democrats.** Governors seeking re-election show the weakest support in both parties, while outgoing governors are more supportive. The difference is larger among Democrats, suggesting that electoral considerations may constrain their support more strongly. However, the comparison shows an association rather than proving that electoral pressure drives these positions.

Affordability pressures offer a possible explanation. As cost-of-living concerns compete with climate objectives for political attention, governors facing voters may be more cautious about supporting developments that voters perceive as conflicting with household affordability. This is consistent with the pack's broader narrative, although the chart does not establish whether affordability explains the pattern or why the contrast is greater among Democrats. **Republican governors remain more supportive regardless of electoral circumstances.** The partisan gap is widest among governors not on the ballot and narrowest among those leaving office, where Democratic support comes closer to Republican levels. Taken together, the findings suggest that party affiliation provides a useful guide to data-center support, but electoral circumstances are an important qualification.

Data center durability within each governor race




3. State-level energy policy frozen in place

States are increasingly settling into established policy positions rather than moving collectively in either direction. Most high-credibility states continue to sit in the upper-right quadrants, combining strong policy frameworks with either positive momentum or policy stability, while many lower-credibility states remain clustered around weaker policy positions. The durability results suggest that large-scale policy movement is becoming less common. Rather than widespread progress or rollback, many states now exhibit limited momentum in either direction, reflecting the broader decline in climate-policy salience. As a result, state energy policy appears increasingly entrenched, with credibility levels remaining strongly differentiated across states.

The exceptions remain important. States such as Rhode Island, New Mexico and Michigan continue to demonstrate positive momentum, while states such as Oregon show that even relatively credible policy frameworks can face future implementation or durability challenges. Overall, however, the dominant picture is one of policy persistence rather than rapid change.

Credibility scorings trend higher for Democratic states



Forward-looking: where we expect the story could go either way

Georgia, Iowa and Kansas sit in a critical balance: potential changes in political control could shift the direction of energy and climate policy but not necessarily deliver an immediate policy reversal.

In **Georgia**, the potential upside is a break in Republican unified control. A win for Keisha Lance Bottoms could bring greater emphasis on climate and equity, but with Republicans expected to retain both legislative chambers, the scope for major reforms would remain constrained. The opportunity is therefore for incremental progress rather than a wholesale policy reset.

Iowa presents a similar possibility of breaking a Republican trifecta, but with a different policy emphasis. Rob Sand’s pragmatic positioning and focus on clean water suggest that any progress could be framed around specific environmental priorities rather than a broad climate agenda.

Kansas, by contrast, faces a downside risk. A Ty Masterson victory could create a Republican trifecta, strengthening the position of a candidate who has opposed renewable-electricity standards and green-energy subsidies. The key takeaway is that these potential flips are not equivalent: Georgia and Iowa offer openings for progress, while Kansas could move towards a less supportive policy environment.

States that could go either way;

- 1. **Georgia** - Opportunity for decarbonization progress, Republican Trifecta at risk, Keisha Lance Bottoms (D) (opposition) views climate change as intersectional equity challenge. Republicans are expected to retain both chambers, so a Bottoms win would end the Republican trifecta but constrain major reforms; a Jackson win (R) would preserve it.
- 2. **Iowa** - Republican trifecta at risk due to competitive Democrat governor candidate; Rob Sand (D) has run more as pragmatic Midwestern Democrat rather than environmental activist; clean water is core.
- 3. **Kansas** - Possible new republican trifecta (R need governor), Ty Masterson (Republican) is a climate skeptic and has pushed back on state-level renewable electricity standards and green energy subsidies. A Masterson victory would therefore create a Republican trifecta and increase downside risk for climate and clean-energy policy.

State	Emissions	Power Generation	Transport	Buildings	Durability	Score Change 2024– 2026	Key
<div>Georgia</div> <div></div>	<div>▼</div> <div>Score: 1 No GHG emissions target enacted</div>	<div>■</div> <div>Score: 1 No mandated target</div>	<div>▼</div> <div>Score: 2 Discontinued LEV/ZEV and MHD tax credits</div>	<div>■</div> <div>Score: 1 2015 IECC with amendments; equivalent to 2009 IECC</div>	0	2.5 > 1.3	<div>▼ Deteriorated</div> <div>▲ Improved</div> <div>■ No change</div>
<div>Iowa</div> <div></div>	<div>▼</div> <div>Score: 1 No GHG emissions target enacted</div>	<div>▼</div> <div>Score: 1 no mandated target</div>	<div>■</div> <div>Score: 2 Financial incentives + funding for diesel emission reduction projects</div>	<div>■</div> <div>Score: 1 Equivalent to 2009 IECC</div>	1	1.3 > 1.3	
<div>Kansas</div> <div></div>	<div>▼</div> <div>Score: 1 No GHG emissions target enacted</div>	<div>▼</div> <div>Score: 1 no mandated target</div>	<div>▼</div> <div>Score: 2 Financial incentives for charging station installation</div>	<div>■</div> <div>Score: 2 2018 IECC jurisdiction</div>	-2	2.8 > 1.5	

Energy Intelligence



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